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29 **I. INTRODUCTION**

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31 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2013 [1] reports with 95% certainty
32 that humans are the cause of recent climate change, a conclusion with which 97.1%
33 of scientific papers published on climate change agree [2]. CO₂ levels rose with the
34 global temperature after the ice ages [3], as shown in Figure 1. From the 1850s, the
35 industrial revolution and modern era produced nearly twice the levels of CO₂. The
36 difference in temperature, in comparison to that from 150 years ago, strongly suggests
37 that human-activity is warming the globe, again shown in Figure 1. This is
38 fundamental scientific evidence for the role of human activities in causing climate
39 change [4, 5, 6].

40

41 How can we mitigate this rise in CO₂? Energy production is by far the largest
42 contributor to CO₂ emissions through the burning of coal, oil and natural gas [7].
43 Replacing these large-scale energy production methods with a near net-zero CO₂
44 emitting energy source is therefore one clear answer.

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46 Wind and solar energy are considered major alternative energy source candidates,
47 however, an often misunderstood large-scale, reliable, and near net-zero CO₂ emission
48 energy source is nuclear fission. The need for a "green" energy source will become
49 increasingly important with time as consumption of energy will only increase,
50 regardless of the efficiency savings, with the rapid expansion of electrified rail,
51 vehicles and steel industry. Electrical vehicles consumption alone will increase from
52 0.03% in 2014 to 9.5% in 2050 [8].


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54 The expansion of Nuclear Energy to tackle climate change is seen as a key stepping-
 55 stone to meet the Paris Agreement signed in December 2015, but its success will
 56 require increased governmental and public support. This claim echoes statements
 57 made by the International Energy Agency [9], Bill Gates [10], the Intergovernmental
 58 Panel on Climate Change [6], and the MIT Energy Initiative [11].

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60 As nuclear power has been known to be a reliable, large-scale and safe energy source
 61 since the 1960s, why then do we not embrace nuclear energy and expand it greatly to
 62 curb climate change?

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65 **Figure 1:** The measurements of carbon dioxide and temperature difference are
 66 achieved by monitoring the concentrations of various trapped gases in Antarctica's

67 ice¹. The data has been compiled from Vostok and EPIC Dome C ice cores. See
68 reference [4] and [5] for the original raw data. From the last 150 years, it is clear from
69 the trend in CO₂ parts per million that the release as a result of the industrial revolution
70 and modern era. The plotted temperature difference in the atmosphere correlates with
71 the increase in CO₂ emissions.

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73 One reason is the dissemination of misinformation by the media leading to ill-
74 informed policy makers and politicians. Examples include claims that the United
75 Kingdom's (UK) nuclear power industry is slowly dying [12], the uranium fuel supply
76 can only last another 100 years [13] and nuclear reactors are fundamentally a
77 proliferation hazard from the plutonium they produce [14].

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79 Producing scientifically accurate accounts of nuclear energy is therefore imperative in
80 combating the spread of misinformation to the general public, which will in turn lead
81 to increased governmental support for the Nuclear Industry.

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83 The main objective of this article is, therefore, to present an account of the nuclear
84 sector from a scientific perspective, drawing on the author's personal experience of
85 working within the nuclear energy sector. This article will evaluate whether the
86 nuclear power industry is shrinking in the UK, the lifetime of the global supply of
87 uranium, and if weaponisation is the only viable use of plutonium.

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89 **II. THE UK'S NUCLEAR INDUSTRY IS SHRINKING**

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¹ The measurement of CO₂ is a direct measurement of the gas concentration trapped in the ice. The temperature difference measurement is an indirect measurement, based on the ratio of deuterium (isotope of hydrogen) and oxygen-18 (isotope of oxygen) to today's value (see reference [39] for further detail). The reference value is the natural ratio of deuterium found in nature.

91 There were 448 operational nuclear power stations that produce a total capacity of 392
92 Giga Watt electrical (GW(e)) output, as of 31 December 2017, and an additional 59
93 units which will produce 60 GW(e) are under construction. The total contribution to
94 the world's electricity supply is therefore 10%. Further, a conservative estimate from
95 a recent 2018 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on world energy [15]
96 estimates an increase to 511 GW(e) by 2030 and to 748 GW(e) by 2050.

97
98 The IAEA report assumes that current market, technology and resource trends will
99 continue with no changes made to current laws and regulations. The misconception
100 that the market is shrinking loosely follows the low estimates determined by the
101 IAEA's report. The fact that the industry has not changed significantly since the 1960-
102 1980 rapid construction phase, during which most of these 448 operational reactors
103 were built, does reinforce this misconception.

104
105 The UK newest nuclear reactor in construction at Hinkley Point C, England, is using
106 pressurised water reactor technology that has evolved over the decades. This reactor
107 design, called EPR by EDF Energy, has optimised the use of water to cool and
108 moderate a nuclear fission chain reaction. However, the suspension [16, 17] of the
109 Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) nuclear power station in January 2019 at
110 the Wylfa site, does not bode well for the UK industry; it had received regulatory
111 approval [18], and Horizon Nuclear Power and Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy Ltd. were
112 ready to begin construction. It should be noted that the suspension is related to the
113 project's financing and not on a technology or engineering basis.

114
115 The suspension has forced the UK Government to reassess its financing model of new
116 nuclear power stations. It is clear from both Hinkley Point C and Wylfa that allowing

117 the free-market to fund a full nuclear power station is not ideal as it would be too great
118 of an expense for a single corporation [19].

119

120 This sentiment was echoed by the Secretary of the Department of Business, Energy
121 and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), the Rt Hon Greg Clark MP [20], in an oral statement
122 to parliament where he acknowledged that the current financing model is non-
123 optimal, stating that the government “[...] are therefore reviewing the viability of a
124 Regulated Asset Base (RAB) model and assessing whether it can offer value for money
125 for consumers and taxpayers. I can confirm to the House that we intend to publish our
126 assessment of this method by the summer at the latest.”

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128 The RAB model [21] ultimately mitigates the construction risk of projects by enabling
129 investors to receive returns before the project has been completed. If the model was
130 applied to Hinkley Point C nuclear power station, the project could be up to 20%
131 cheaper [22]. This change in the Government's approach might allow the Wylfa
132 project to continue once the announcement is made this summer. The RAB model
133 could be applied to EDF Energy's future reactor at Sizewell C, China Nuclear Systems
134 Ltd's HPR1000 reactor at Bradwell C, and the Moorside site in Cumbria, enabling a
135 strong industry for the long-term future.

136

137 If we look to the next 20-50 years, Generation IV nuclear reactor designs have been
138 positioned as ‘advanced²’, passive, safe, proliferation resistant, fuel efficient, and
139 economically favourable nuclear reactors compared to the in-construction Generation
140 III (EPR, ABWR and HPR1000 reactors, for example). The ‘Generation’ definition for

² The term advanced does not actually mean anything tangible unless context is provided. The current Advanced Gas Reactors that are operating in the UK since the 1970s are ‘advanced’.

141 nuclear reactors is shown in Figure 2. However up until 2017, the UK Government has
142 not officially announced any formal involvement with Generation IV reactor designs.

143

144 The Clean Growth Strategy was announced by BEIS in October 2017 [23] and outlines
145 the policy to decarbonise all sectors of the UK economy through the 2020s. Specifically
146 for the nuclear sector, the policy released £460 million to support future nuclear fuels,
147 new manufacturing techniques, reprocessing, and advanced reactor design³. In
148 addition, the aims of the Nuclear Sector Deal [24], which was launched on 28 June
149 2018, are to reduce the cost of nuclear technology by 30%, increase the percentage of
150 women in the nuclear industry to 40%, and investing a total of £2 billion in domestic
151 and foreign supply chain contracts by 2030. Further, the Deal shows an interest in
152 Small Modular Reactors (SMR), which are an existing nuclear power station type but
153 are on a smaller scale (300MW(e)), as well as showing an interesting in the funding for
154 Generation IV nuclear reactors (called Advanced Modular Reactors (AMR) within the
155 policy).

156

157 The investment released by the Government has ignited the nuclear industry to
158 innovate and move towards the SMR and AMR markets; these markets are in their
159 infancy and, if action is taken quickly enough, the UK could become an epicentre of
160 advanced nuclear technology. Further, the Nuclear Innovation and Research
161 Advisory Board released their 2019 review [25] and recommend the UK Government
162 should invest £1 billion from 2021 to 2026 into the advanced reactor market to meet
163 the Clean Growth Strategy.


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³ Advanced in this context is referencing Generation IV nuclear reactors.

165 Today's nuclear export market (shown in Figure 3) is dominated by Russia's Rosatom⁴
 166 [26], and soon-to-be China's 'go global' policy⁵ [27], both of which use their exports as
 167 a strengthening mechanisms to grow their spheres of influence. There is potential that
 168 the UK could become a significant nuclear export country again with the export of
 169 SMR and AMR reactors from the 2030s and beyond. If the UK is to become a nuclear
 170 exporter, the overarching message is that investment and policy changes need to
 171 continue to enable large-scale production⁶ [25] of SMRs and Generation IV nuclear.

172
 173 So, is the UK nuclear industry shrinking? From the re-evaluation of the financial
 174 models to the funding of new nuclear reactors, as well as for the UK's potential to
 175 become an advanced nuclear export country, the UK's industry is very much alive.


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178 **Figure 2:** Timeline of the Generation definition for nuclear reactors. (Light Water
 179 Reactor (LWR).)

⁴ Rosatom is the Russia Federation's state-owned and state-operated nuclear energy corporation.
⁵ China National Nuclear Corporation, China General Nuclear Power Group and State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation are the three main communist party-controlled and communist party-led nuclear export corporations.
⁶ Large-scale production is defined as more than four nuclear reactors or more.



180 The Economist

181 **Figure 3:** Current (2018) new nuclear reactor exports coloured by country. Figure
 182 reproduced from reference [28].

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184 III. THE LIFETIME OF URANIUM

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186 Issues surrounding the lifetime of uranium for nuclear reactors (and weapons) have
 187 been raised ever since the energy security issues were realised during the 1970s oil
 188 crisis [29]. It is worth noting that during this oil crisis, the French government decided
 189 to reduce the country's dependence on oil by producing 72.3% of their electricity
 190 through nuclear energy [30]. Climate change was not discussed at the time however
 191 their decision has been quite fortuitous; France's CO₂ emission per GDP was less than
 192 half of the OECD average in 2014 [31]. This is not surprising when recent analysis
 193 (2013) show that nuclear energy reduces the long-term CO₂ emissions [17].

194

195 Globally, the total identified recoverable uranium is 6,142,000 tonnes of low-cost
 196 uranium metal [29] and 7,988,000 tonnes of high-cost uranium metal. There are two

197 naturally⁷ occurring isotopes⁸ of uranium; uranium-235 and uranium-237, possessing
198 a relative natural abundance of 0.720% and 99.244% respectively. Generation I-III
199 (1960s to 2030s) nuclear reactors primarily use Uranium-235 although it must first be
200 enriched⁹ to maintain a sustainable chain reaction for power production. The
201 assumption made in the IAEA report [29] is that current global nuclear fleet maintains
202 these operating conditions, with no new advanced nuclear reactors deployed,
203 resulting in a 130 year supply of uranium-235.

204

205 There are six Generation IV nuclear reactors in consideration, four of which have a
206 'fast'¹⁰ neutron energy spectrum. Splitting uranium (also called nuclear fission)
207 produces sub-atomic neutrons with a spectrum of energy, with slow¹¹ neutrons only
208 being able to split uranium-235, not uranium-238. Generation I-III reactors are only
209 able to split uranium-235 because the neutrons are slowed down by either water or
210 graphite (reactor design dependent) and can therefore only utilise 0.720% of the
211 natural uranium supply. Generation IV reactors have neutron energies that range
212 from slow to fast, thus increase the likelihood of fission. The neutrons have enough
213 energy to produce plutonium-239,240,241, and an appreciable fission fraction of
214 heavier transuranic atoms (neptunium, americium, and protactinium) from uranium-
215 238.

216

217 The key message is that Generation IV nuclear reactors can theoretically utilise the
218 entire supply of naturally occurring uranium, as fission of both uranium-235 and

⁷ Natural references the element can be naturally found on the Earth.

⁸ Isotope is the name given to atoms of the same chemical element which have different atomic masses.

⁹ Increasing the abundance of uranium-235 to 3-4%.

¹⁰ Fast indicates the neutrons have an energy between 0.5 MeV to 2 MeV.

¹¹ Slow (or also called Thermal) neutrons have an energy in the range of 0.025 eV.

219 uranium-238 is possible, leading to a significantly longer supply lifetime than that
 220 estimated by the IAEA [29].

221

222 If we neglect the assumption that no new Generation IV nuclear reactors will be built,
 223 then the natural uranium supply lifetime (T) will be a ratio of potential Generation IV
 224 utilisation to the Generation I-III utilisation. While Generation IV reactors could
 225 theoretically utilise 100% of the natural uranium, they are limited to an utilisation
 226 range between 43.2%-57.6% [32], by engineering, design, economic and fuel cladding
 227 material lifetime restrictions [33].

228

$$229 \quad \frac{T}{130 \text{ years}} = \frac{43.2 \text{ to } 57.6 \%}{0.720\%}$$

230

$$231 \quad T = 130 \text{ years} \times \frac{43.2 \text{ to } 57.6 \%}{0.72\%} = \mathbf{7,800 \text{ to } 10,400 \text{ years}}$$

232

233 It can be argued, however, that the future of the uranium supply should not be of a
 234 concern to the human race because in a few hundred years, a more optimum energy
 235 source such as nuclear fusion energy will have been developed [11].

236

237 **IV. THE ONLY USE OF PLUTONIUM IS AS A WEAPON.**

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239 It is often believed that the plutonium produced from the transmutation¹² of uranium-
 240 238 in operating reactors can only be used for nuclear weapons. However, there are
 241 two different categorisations of Plutonium containing mixtures, depending on the
 242 mixture's composition:

¹² The nuclear process that converts one chemical isotope into another chemical isotope.

243

244 i) Weapons-grade plutonium: plutonium-239 with less than 8% plutonium-240. It is
245 not produced in civil operating reactors in the UK because the desire for these reactors
246 are to produce electricity, so the fuel irradiation time is longer¹³.

247

248 ii) Reactor-grade plutonium: 55-70% plutonium-239 with more than 19% plutonium-
249 240. This grade is produced in all civil operating reactors and comprises about 1% of
250 all used fuel.

251

252 Reprocessing is the name given for the extraction of plutonium from spent fuel rods¹⁴.
253 Sellafield, the nuclear fuel reprocessing, decommissioning site, and home to our
254 nuclear waste, in Cumbria, England, has the world's largest civil stockpile (126 tonnes
255 of plutonium) [34].

256

257 Reactor-grade plutonium cannot be weaponised, however, it can be used as fuel for a
258 fast neutron spectrum-based reactor, such as Generation IV nuclear reactors. As
259 explained in Section III, the fast neutron spectrum is able to fission plutonium-239 and
260 -240. This fact enables companies, such as GE-Hitachi in 2011, to propose a Generation
261 IV reactor to be built in the UK that solely uses the plutonium stockpile as reactor'
262 fuel. The reactor, called PRISM, could dispose all of the UK's plutonium stockpile
263 through the generation of 25% of the UK's electricity for the next 100 years [35, 36].
264 With the recent UK Government's announcement and investment in Generation IV
265 nuclear reactors outlined in Section II, the reality of reducing and removing the
266 plutonium stockpile in Sellafield is therefore within reach.

¹³ The longer the irradiation time, the more chance you will convert artificially produced plutonium-239 to plutonium-240 through neutron capture physics process.

¹⁴ Once the fuel rod in a nuclear reactor has been permanently pulled out from the core, it is now classified as spent fuel.

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V. CONCLUSION

Climate change is occurring due to the release of CO₂ from non-naturally occurring sources, primarily due to energy production. Nuclear energy is reliable, safe, large-scale, and produces near net-zero CO₂ emissions offering a means of both satisfying the world's energy demands and a method to mitigate climate change.

In order to achieve this ambition, the public perception of nuclear energy requires improvement, through recognition of the existence and viability of sound scientific and technical options to solve the current challenges facing the industry.

Generation IV nuclear reactor technology can provide tangible solutions to reducing nuclear waste through plutonium fuel usage, extend the uranium supply lifetime up to 10,000 years, and revive the nuclear industry. The UK Government has produced multiple policy papers that outline the appetite to develop Generation IV nuclear reactors in the UK; a promising sign.

The future is very bright for the global nuclear industry, research community and energy markets because of the long-term potential of nuclear fusion energy, in addition to the construction and planning required for current reactors, in addition to the Generation IV reactors of the future. Ultimately, Generation IV reactor technology can become a means through which the aims of the Paris Climate Agreement can be met, leading to a large-scale reduction in climate change.

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